A proposed framework for short-, medium- and long-term responses by range and consumer States to curb poaching for African rhino horn by Ferreira, S.M. & Ouma, B.O.
52 Pachyderm No. 51 January–June 2012
MANAGEMENT
Introduction
Escalating poaching for rhino horn poses a renewed 
threat to the persistence of all extant species and 
subspecies of African rhinos. The number of rhinos 
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Abstract
African rhinos are suffering a new poaching onslaught for their high-priced horns. Despite intensified anti-
poaching activities, the number of rhinos poached per day has continued to increase since 2008. Between 
2010 and 2011 more than 1.5% of the African rhino population was poached each year: a higher percentage 
is projected for 2012. This trend in increased poaching will reverse overall positive rhino population growth 
in the long term. In response, a rhino emergency summit comprising representatives of rhino range States, the 
private sector, government officials and non-governmental organizations met in Nairobi during April 2012. 
Following this meeting, we propose an integrated framework directed at reducing the demand-and-supply 
ratio associated with the use of rhino horn. The framework is envisaged to guide short- as well as medium- 
to long-term responses by range States directed at reducing the incentives for poaching and ensuring the 













poached has increased exponentially since 2008, 
particularly in South Africa (Thomas, 2010). The 
proportion of rhinos illegally killed was more than 
1.5% of South African rhinos and slightly more than 
2% per annum in Kenya. This has resulted in a decline 
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in overall rhino population growth across Africa 
from 9.4% annually between 2005 and 2007, when 
poaching was relatively low, to 5.1% annually between 
2008 and 2010, when poaching escalated (calculated 
from population estimates extracted from the African 
Rhino Specialist Group, Chair Mike Knight). Kenya, 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe protect over 
RI$IULFD¶VEODFNDQGZKLWHUKLQRV.QLJKW
Botswana, Swaziland and Tanzania each conserve 
RYHUUKLQRVZKLOH$QJROD0DODZL0R]DPELTXH
Uganda and Zambia conserve fewer than 100 rhinos 
each (Knight, 2011). 
Some authorities speculate that the increase in 
poaching results from societal changes in some Asian 
countries such as Vietnam (Anon, 2011) that has led 
to an increase in demand that is not associated with 
traditional Chinese medicinal use (Lever, 2004). 
Furthermore, anti-poaching investigations and 
intelligence in some African rhino range States suggest 
that organized crime syndicates exploit and, perhaps 
even manipulate the newly expanded demand for rhino 
horn. This may partly result from stock of illegal horn 
within consumer states being exhausted. The result 
is that rhino horn has high value in the black market 
(Anon, 2011) and thus provides financial incentives for 
exploitation of the commodity (Fischer, 2004), both 
legal and illegal.
In curbing the threat posed by poaching, 
government authorities of African rhino range States 
have responded with aggressive intent. At the CITES 
15th Conference of Parties in Doha, Qatar, in 2010, 
the Parties unanimously adopted amendments to 
Resolution Conf. 9.14 on the rhinoceros to obligate 
implicated consumer States to report to IUCN and 
TRAFFIC their efforts in curbing illegal rhino horn 
trade in their countries. Since then, there have been 
bilateral discussions between some range States and 
implicated consumer States. 
Range States have also allocated increased 
resources. South Africa, for example, which protects 
RI$IULFD¶VZKLWH UKLQRVDQGRI WKHEODFN
(Knight, 2011) has increased State funding for anti-
poaching and rhino security activities from USD 20 
million to USD 57 million per year since 2008 (South 
African National Parks, unpublished data). Even 
though the South African National Defence Force, 
the South African Police Services and South African 
National Parks (SANParks) have coordinated responses 
to poaching threats in Kruger National Park since 2009, 
the poaching onslaught continues. During 2007 in 
South Africa, an average of 0.03 rhinos were poached 
per day, but by March 2012 that had risen to 1.63 per 
day with no signs of poaching tapering off (SANParks, 
unpublished data ). If the poaching intensity trend 
continues, statistically detectable declines are predicted 
for the white rhino population of Kruger National 
Park, South Africa, by 2016 (Ferreira et al., 2012) 
given the relative imprecision of population estimates 
derived through standard surveying of large mammals 
(e.g. Ferreira et al., 2011a). This may reflect a more 
widespread expected trend in rhino numbers elsewhere 
in South Africa if poaching threats continue.
Kenya has also intensified anti-poaching efforts by, 
for example, declaring 2012 as the Year of the Rhino 
to direct focus and resources to rhino conservation 
and protection. Other efforts have included increasing 
the rhino ranger force by more than 25% during 
2011, converting rhino scouts on private rhino lands 
into Kenya Police reservists, offering formal training 
to community scouts in wildlife protection, using 
sniffer dogs at international ports and tracker dogs for 
monitoring, and relocating rhinos from areas of high 
risk to areas of low risk. Despite these efforts, poachers 
still killed two rhinos per month, which translated to 
PRUHWKDQSHUDQQXPRI.HQ\D¶VUKLQRVVLQFH
2009. This has impacted negatively on the overall 
rhino population growth rate in 2010 and 2011 (Kenya 
Wildlife Service, unpublished data ).
Zimbabwe has enhanced its wildlife crime 
penalties, conducted annual rhino operations of 
dehorning and marking, strengthened intelligence 
gathering, conducted crime-awareness campaigns, 
appointed a special rhino task force, and is currently 
reviewing intensive protection zone models. In spite 
of these efforts, State land populations continue to be 
poached while some have been poached to extinction 
(e.g. the Iwaba rhinos). At only three localities within 
Zimbabwe may rhino numbers be on the increase. In 
contrast, Namibia, a stronghold for the southwestern 
black rhino (D. bicornis bicornis), has not experienced 
the same surge in poaching as elsewhere in Africa. 
The above examples suggest that poaching intensity 
varies across range States and more importantly, that 
anti-poaching effort alone will not protect African 
rhinos and decrease extinction risks for all subspecies. 
The present situation is clearly dire. In this paper we 
propose a framework of response following a recent 
emergency summit called by the African Wildlife 
)RXQGDWLRQ $:)²ZZZDZIRUJ DQG WKH.HQ\D
:LOGOLIH6HUYLFH.:6²ZZZNZVJRNHLQ1DLUREL
Kenya. We seek to explore the key drivers creating 
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poaching incentives and then construct a suite of 
tactical as well as strategic actions directed at ensuring 
the persistence of African rhinos.
Conceptual framework
Ecological problem solving has two essential 
approaches: 1) those that deal with the symptoms 
of a problem and 2) those that focus on the causes 
(Commission on Life Sciences, 1986). Dealing with 
the symptoms of a problem can be termed a tactical 
approach while dealing with causes can be termed 
strategic. We make use of elephants as an example to 
illustrate this. 
Elephant (Loxodonta africana) impacts, both 
ecological and on humans, have traditionally been 
perceived to be associated with high local elephant 
densities (Cumming et al., 1997; Lee and Graham, 
2006). Local high elephant densities, or intensity 
of use (van Aarde et al., 2006), are a symptom of 
where critical resources are (Young, 2010) and how 
elephants respond spatially (Young et al., 2009) as 
well as demographically (Trimble et al., 2009) to those 
resources. A common traditional tactical response was 
to reduce elephant densities through for instance culling 
(van Aarde et al., 1999) or translocation (Garai et al., 
2004). This type of response can be considered re-
active as managers respond once elephants have already 
reached high densities. Pro-active tactical responses 
might be to prevent elephant densities becoming high 
through for instance applying contraceptives (Fayer-
Hosken et al., 2000). However, these responses have 
not addressed the primary driver or cause, i.e. resource 
distribution, of the elephant problem associated with 
ecological impact (Guldemond and van Aarde, 2008) 
or human conflict (Lee and Graham, 2006). 
An alternative approach is for managers to apply 
strategic approaches to deal with the cause of the 
problem (van Aarde et al., 2006). In our example, a pro-
active strategic response would be to restore landscape 
limitations through, for instance, naturalizing water 
distribution by removing water points that artificially 
supplement water availability (Smit et al., 2007) and 
causing elephants to use landscapes variably (van 
Aarde and Jackson, 2007). When constraints like small 
areas prevent landscape restoration, managers have 
the option to be strategically re-active by inducing 
variability in spatial use of landscapes by elephants 
through, for instance, various forms of disturbance 
W\SLFDOO\ XVHG WR UHGXFH KXPDQăZLOGOLIH FRQIOLFW
(Osborn and Parker, 2003).
Given the example above, we anticipate that the 
primary cause of rhino poaching comes from incentives 
driven by the financial value of horn, as is often the case 
with exploitation of natural resources (fig. 1, adapted 
from Ferreira et al., 2012). The financial value or price 
of a commodity is primarily driven by demand and 
supply ratios (Damania and Bulte, 2007), of which 
the dynamics may differ depending on whether the 
HFRQRPLFVDGKHUH VWURQJO\ WR DSURGXFHUăFRQVXPHU
market (Gregory and Stuart, 2004) or a speculation 
market (Niederhoffer and Kenner, 2003). Even so, our 
FHQWUDOSURSRVLWLRQLVDFRPPRQHFRQRPLFRQH²WKH
larger the difference between high demand and low 
supply of a commodity, the higher the price of that 
commodity and the more attractive that commodity 
is for exploitation both legally and illegally. Strategic 
scenarios will deal with this driver as the primary cause 
of rhino poaching.
Rhino conservationists can influence supply in two 
alternative ways: 1) suppressing or eliminating supply 
or alternatively, 2) enhancing supply. Suppressing 
or eliminating supply has several components that 
dichotomize into re-active and pro-active responses 
(Table 1). These actions are aimed at providing 
disincentives to poachers. The effectiveness of 
disincentives is toned in some instances by the 
minimum wage of the work force in a community. In 
such cases because of limited returns on alternatives 
for income generation, low-wage earners are likely 
to continue poaching even if threat of prosecution 
and the probability of loss of life are high (Messer, 
2010). Suppressing supply is a tactical response in the 
short term that may best be achieved by coordinated 
approaches by African range States.
Our central proposition suggests that when 
VXSSUHVVLQJVXSSO\WKHGHPDQGăVXSSO\UDWLRLQFUHDVHV
(fig. 1). This leads to increase in the price of a horn, 
which in turn provides larger incentives for poaching. 
Disincentives through intensified pro-active and re-
active tactics that suppress supply may not outweigh the 
induced higher incentive for poaching. Such scenarios 
WKXVUHTXLUHFRPSHQVDWRU\VXSSUHVVLRQRIGHPDQGDW
a faster rate than the rate of suppressing supply. Given 
that demand is ultimately the driver, suppressing 
demand through primarily awareness and education 
(Steg and Vlek, 2009) and, perhaps, international 
diplomacy (Epure et al., 2009) is a strategically re-
active urgently needed response. This response seeks to 
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compensate for the likely effects of reduction in supply 
on the financial value of rhino horn. In addition, African 
rhino conservationists may achieve substantial strategic 
re-active gains if international crime syndicates are 
disrupted, assuming that organized crime is a key 
modulator of the new demand for rhino horn noted in 
some Asian countries (Anon, 2011).
A second option of rhino conservationists is 
enhancing supply, which directly targets the reduction 
RI WKH GHPDQGăVXSSO\ UDWLR ZLWKLQ RXU FHQWUDO
Figure 1. A conceptual framework for short-, medium- and long-term approaches to curb poaching for African rhino 
horn based on a model of demand and supply (Ferreira et al., 2012) as a key determinant of the financial value of rhino 
horn as a commodity. These approaches serve as propositions that carry uncertainties if, for instance, the provision of 
supply stimulates demand and no concurrent responses to suppress demand are taking place. The demand–supply 
ratio may then increase with increased value in the horn and poaching incentives. Similar uncertainties comprise actions 
associated with short-term responses.
Re-active Pro-active
Rhino security coordinated response task teams 
for swiftly dealing with incidences
Dehorning rhinos assumed to reduce gain per effort for 
poachers 
Sniffer dogs at ports of export for detection of 
horns in transport
Toxic treatment of horns assumed to place end-users 
at risk
High technology for detection and persecution of 
transgressors
Chemical deterrent of horns assumed to reduce the 
willingness of end users to use
DNA profiling that assists with prosecution
Relocation of rhinos from less safe to relatively 
safer conservation areas
Intelligence directed at pre-emptive strikes on poachers
Common stiff penalties for poaching crimes
Table 1. Examples of pro-active and reactive tactical responses directed at suppressing supply of rhino horn 
through providing disincentives to poachers and end users
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proposition (fig. 1). Several ways can be constructed 
to enhance supply (Table 2, adapted from Ferreira 
et al., 2012) with each carrying advantages and 
GLVDGYDQWDJHV7KHUHGXFWLRQRI WKHGHPDQGăVXSSO\
ratio would be enhanced if a concomitant reduction in 
demand took place, particularly across the spectrum of 
old and new demand. However, there is no guarantee 
that providing rhino horn will result in reduction in 
demand given there is no information on the number 
of potential users that are currently restricted by high 
financial value. In fact, the provision of rhino horn may 
stimulate dormant markets because of affordability to 
a larger fraction of potential consumers. Enhancing 
supply and reducing demand are strategically pro-
active actions directed at influencing the financial 
value of rhino horn as an incentive for exploitation 
both legally and illegally.
The way forward
At the recent rhino summit facilitated by AWF and 
KWS, experts from the African range States agreed 
to short- as well as medium- to long-term responses, 
HDFKRIZKLFKKDVFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHGHPDQGDQG
supply ratio (fig. 1). The short-term responses are 
directed at reducing supply through collaborative 
intensified anti-poaching and rhino security activities, 
but with an immediate and urgent need to conduct 
education and awareness programmes in implicated 
consumer countries targeting the new horn users 
(Anon, 2011). The medium- and long-term responses 
UHTXLUH FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI SURYLGLQJ UKLQR KRUQ DQG
understanding of drivers of demand in future. 
These multi-term scenarios carry two challenges. 
Typically, conservationists seek implementable 
scenarios, but they seldom ask which scenario will 
be the best. We focus on the latter as a key step 
UHTXLUHGEHIRUHRSHUDWLRQDOSODQVFDQEHHVWDEOLVKHG
and evaluated. Scenarios may carry different negative 
(risks) and positive (benefits) outcomes for potentially 
six different objectives of international importance for 
rhinos (i.e. 1) continued existence of African rhinos, 
2) continued existence of Asian rhinos, 3) value of 
live rhinos, 4) value of rhino horn, 5) expectations 
of range State stakeholders, and 6) expectations of 
consumer state stakeholders). The primary biodiversity 
objective is to reduce the threat posed by poaching and 
hence extinction of African rhino species. However, 
poachers tend to focus on other lucrative commodities, 
places or species if the financial value of a specific 
FRPPRGLW\¶VLVUHGXFHGHJ%UDVKDUHVHWDO
A second biodiversity objective is thus to minimize 
threats associated with the displacement of poaching 
activities to Asian rhino species. This predicts that 
tactical scenarios that suppress supply within African 
rhino range States may also need to be matched by 
intensified anti-poaching activities in Asian rhino range 
States, particularly if responses by African range States 
are focused on intensified pro-active and re-active 
anti-poaching.
Two additional objectives that scenarios should 
consider associate with the value of rhinos both as a 
FRPPRGLW\RIWKHUKLQRLWVHOIDQGUKLQRKRUQµW6DV
Rolfes, 2012). Live rhinos have a value in the game 
sales market that is separated from that generated by 
the rhino horn demand in Asian countries. Another two 
objectives are associated with societal expectations and 
Table 2. Examples of trade options (adapted and revised from Ferreira et al., 2012)
Option Detail
No trade No trade in rhino horn of any format both internationally or na-
tionally and consider option of destroying stockpiles
Stockpile sales Existing stockpiles made available to a trading partner using the 
same model as that used for recent elephant ivory sales
Sale of horn harvested from rhinos 
within their natural distribution 
Existing rhino populations provide individuals from which horns 
can be harvested at regular intervals and provided to a regulated 
market
Sale of horn harvested from rhinos 
outside their natural distribution
Establishing rhinos outside natural distributions like the end-user 
States and harvesting horn sustainably
Buy and donate Using donor funding to buy all stockpiled rhino horn stock and 
donating these to end-user States in a regulated industry
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TXDOLW\RIOLYLQJLQUDQJHDVZHOODVFRQVXPHU6WDWHV
Within range States, rhino poaching is providing 
considerable public outcry and media challenges for 
politicians and policy makers (Knight, 2011). There is 
thus an expectation from key stakeholders within range 
States that authorities will protect rhinos and effectively 
fight crime. Concomitantly, Western condemnation 
of traditional medicinal use of rhino horns by Eastern 
nations be classified as customary rights discrimination 
(e.g. Fougere, 2006). Key stakeholders within the 
consumer States thus also have expectations that their 
specific cultural traditions are respected and needs 
are met.
For all potential scenarios, predicting the effects 
on these six objectives is substantially challenged by 
the lack of definite knowledge on how demand and 
supply would react to tactical and strategic responses 
by range and consumer States. Understanding the 
dynamics of demand and supply is thus a key strategic 
LQIRUPDWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQW(YHQ VR WR IXOO\ DGYLVH
decisionmakers, both nationally and internationally, 
rhino conservationists within range and consumer 
6WDWHV UHTXLUH DSURFHVV WKDW HYDOXDWHV WKH ULVN DQG
benefits and associated uncertainties that scenarios 
may carry (e.g. Assmuth and Hilden, 2008). Such a 
process should be directed at facilitating a consensus 
approach (Morgan et al., 2012) advocated by all range 
as well as consumer States.
 Typical scenario-planning processes are subjective 
and recognize uncertainty, but do not explicitly account 
for uncertainties (Schoemaker, 2002). Combining 
scenario planning with common environmental risk 
assessment approaches (Mentis, 2010) could provide 
a robust way to find the most appropriate option or 
combination of options. Each scenario has associated 
DFWLRQVHYHQWVRUFRQVHTXHQFHVZKLFKFDUULHVVRPH
impact on each objective. Impact is toned by the degree 
of likelihood that the impact may occur. For instance, 
aggressive awareness campaigns about rhino poaching 
in consumer States should reduce the demand for 
rhino horn. The impact on the persistence of African 
rhinos will be high, but the likelihood that it would 
take place is lower given the tradition of medicinal 
use (Lever, 2004). 
In addition, defining the magnitude of impact on 
an outcome, positive (i.e. benefit) or negative (i.e. 
risk) as well as the likelihood carries various levels 
of uncertainty. Using the same example as above, 
the assignment of high impact and low likelihood 
of awareness campaigns on an outcome of African 
rhino persistence carries a great deal of uncertainty. 
For instance, traditional medicinal use is experiencing 
generational changes globally elsewhere with use 
diminishing among younger people (e.g. Uprety et al., 
2012). It is uncertain whether this holds for medicinal 
use of rhino horn in traditional consumer States.
The total risk or benefit of a specific event to an 
objective associated with a scenario is thus a product 
of the impact, likelihood and uncertainty. We suggest 
that such an approach will provide range as well as 
consumer States with the best scenario or combination 
of scenarios that carries the largest ratio of benefits to 
risks in achieving all six objectives given uncertainties. 
Such an approach has been used to deal with morally 
complex and factually uncertain challenges (Dickson 
and Adams, 2009) such as elephant management across 
several spatial scales and ecological problems in South 
Africa (e.g. Ferreira et al., 2011b). If applied to the 
rhino poaching challenge, coordinated responses will 
thus have a transparent rationale. We anticipate that 
after following the above process, conservationists 
should find it relatively easy to justify funding and 
find resources for implementation through operational 
plans.
The generalized framework provided here offers 
range and consumer States a common understanding of 
WKHFDXVHVDQGFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHSUREOHPDVVRFLDWHG
with poaching for rhino horn in Africa. It also highlights 
that responses will differ on a case-by-case basis or even 
between range and consumer States. Notwithstanding 
these case-specific considerations, responses should be 
GLUHFWHGDWUHGXFLQJWKHGHPDQGăVXSSO\UDWLRRIUKLQR
KRUQ:HVXJJHVWWKDWDZRUNVKRSXVLQJDULVNăEHQHILW
planning process inclusive of all range and consumer 
States within the integrated framework that we have 
proposed is a matter of urgency. This approach and 
framework may be also applicable to several other 
exploited large mammal species threatened with 
extinction.
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